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A B S T R A C T
We explore the impact of renewable energy under free market conditions on the security of energy supply using
data for the German electricity market. We design a fundamental electricity market model, where renewable
energy capacity is not driven by expansion goals, but is dynamically modeled as an economically-driven in-
vestment option. Furthermore, we analyze the economics of five policy scenarios designed to secure both
electricity supply and renewable energy expansion. Our analysis demonstrates that renewable energy expansion
leads to conventional power plant shut-downs (due to economic losses) and, as a result, to energy shortages. We
find that the application of a fixed feed-in tariff mechanism for renewable energy (i.e. a fixed payment for the
provided energy) is an appropriate instrument to simultaneously achieve renewable energy expansion and un-
interrupted energy supply. However, when internalizing the external costs of electricity generation, the scenario
of a free market for renewable energy together with subsidies for conventional power plants becomes the most
cost efficient option.
1. Introduction
The political and economic conditions in Germany for renewable
energy (RE) have changed over the past years. As a consequence, pro-
viders of RE have been participating increasingly in the free electricity
market, instead of relying on fixed feed-in tariffs (FITs). In parallel, the
increasing use of RE technologies with low marginal costs is causing
substantial economic problems for conventional power plants and
consequently for the utility corporations that own them. Recent re-
search (see [1]) has shown that the economic losses of conventional
power plants results in decommissionings and, as a result, in in-
sufficient generation capacity to meet peak demand. Against this
background, the question arises whether the current market mechan-
isms allow for a profitable operation of RE that ensures meeting the
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German Federal Government’s expansion goals of a RE share in total
electricity generation between 40% and 45% in 2025 and between 55%
and 60% in 2035 [2]. Furthermore, it is crucial to raise awareness of
potential energy disruptions and the associated costs of counter-
measures. Uyanik [3] has shown that the number of redispatch actions
required to ensure grid stability has increased significantly, making it
more challenging and costly to maintain the security of energy supply.
Our analysis explores the impacts of RE (on and offshore wind,
solar, water, bioenergy and geothermal) under free market conditions
on the level of security of supply. By applying a fundamental electricity
market model, RE capacity is not driven by expansion goals, but is
dynamically modeled as an economically-driven investment option.
Furthermore, we analyze the economics of five policy scenarios, de-
signed to secure both electricity supply and RE expansion. The policy
scenarios differ in terms of the underlying market designs, subsidies for
conventional and RE power plants and the assumptions concerning
supplementation investments in case of undercapacity. For each policy
scenario, we measure the development of power plant capacity (espe-
cially with regard to RE expansion), total CO2 emissions and the (direct
and external) costs that are necessary to maintain security of supply.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that applies a novel elec-
tricity market design, where a complex of conventional power plants is
optimally adapted to RE supply. In theory, such a composition of power
plants always leads to the highest possible average electricity price and
the most cost efficient supply of electricity. Our analytical framework
pays particular attention to the development of green energy systems
(that maintain security of energy supply and support RE expansion);
this is done by dynamically simulating a mixture of different RE power
plants that are able to generate base-loadable electricity. Moreover, our
analysis contributes to the literature through the development of al-
ternative policy scenarios that give a detailed comparison of the costs
government incurs to reach RE expansion goals and simultaneously
secure energy supply (hence, providing new insights into the future
development of RE and conventional power plants capacity). Based on
an economic comparison of the developed policy scenarios, we provide
clarity to policy-makers regarding the expected direct and external
costs of electricity generation in the future.
Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the expansion of RE and
security of electricity supply. Section 3 presents the modeling frame-
work, the data and the policy scenarios. Section 4 studies the simulation
results and provides a sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. A review of the literature
In this section we provide a review of the recent literature on RE
expansion and the security of energy supply. Given the complexity of
the issue, our literature review draws on studies that largely cut across a
range of disciplinary themes (i.e. across the fields of technology de-
velopment, politics and economics for energy generation, conservation
and efficiency). This broad cross-disciplinary focus allows us to gen-
erate a synthesis of the numerous drivers and barriers behind a suc-
cessful energy transition.
2.1. Expansion of RE
In recent years, there has been a massive cost reduction for wind
and solar energy both in Germany and worldwide [4–11]. Between
2010 and 2012 alone, prices for photovoltaic (PV) modules fell by 75%,
dramatically improving competitiveness of solar power [12]. Further
cost reductions for solar electricity are expected by 2020 [13]. The
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building
and Nuclear Safety [14] predicts that production costs for PV and off-
shore wind electricity will decline to €0.1/kWh by 2030, while corre-
sponding costs for onshore wind are expected to fall to €0.6/kWh.
While utility-scale biomass, hydropower, geothermal and onshore wind
can easily compete with fossil fuel-fired power generation today, the
cost of PV electricity is still somewhat higher on average [15]. Pescia
and Graichen [9] state that, in Germany, onshore wind power and
large-scale solar PV are already cost-competitive with all newly-built
conventional energy sources. At the same time, prices for fossil fuels (as
well as carbon emission costs) are expected to rise in the future; con-
sequently, this would enhance the competitiveness of RE against fossil-
fuel fired plants [16–18]. Lins et al. [19] use the notion of a “virtuous
circle” to describe the improvements in competitiveness of RE; this
refers to a dynamic process where the rapid expansion of RE (initially
encouraged by corresponding support policies) and resulting cost re-
ductions for RE investments mutually reinforce each other.
To achieve carbon-neutral electricity generation, innovations need
to be introduced at different levels (i.e. not only regarding advance-
ments in RE technologies, but also in relation to energy infrastructure
and overall market conditions). According to Harvey [20], the creation
of a stable and reliable market for investors is an important prerequisite
to further drive down prices. He also points out that German authorities
will have to reinvent power markets, expand the transmission grid and
rethink business models for utilities if the energy transition is to suc-
ceed. Wirth [21] suggests that new PV capacity installed still lags be-
hind the energy transition goals and claims that the progress of future
expansion will depend on corresponding incentive schemes for PV
systems. According to Baker et al. [22] and Kabir et al. [23], solar
electricity will be of vital importance in a carbon-constrained future.
Accurately optimized investments, operations and demand manage-
ment decisions, together with extensive near-term R&D funding, are
crucial prerequisites to minimize the cost of reduced fossil-fuel depen-
dence. Under such optimized conditions, they conclude that the grid
integration costs of rising solar penetration can be kept relatively small.
As to remuneration schemes, Narbel [24] focuses on policy tools
that support the expansion of RE and claims that customary instruments
(such as FITs, feed-in premiums or quota systems), are not apt to foster
the most valuable RE technologies (i.e. those which require little fi-
nancial support and limit the need for capacity payments in order to
ensure security of supply) because they ignore the cost of intermittency.
In his view, remuneration should not be arranged as a fixed amount but
in a way that amplifies the variation in prices appearing in the
wholesale electricity market. Ponta et al. [25] investigate the economic
effects of a FIT policy aimed to foster investments in renewable energy
production capacity. Their results show that the FIT mechanism is ef-
fective in promoting the sustainability transition of the energy sector, as
well as increasing investments and employment.
2.2. Security of electricity supply
Modeling and forecasting of RE expansion is a demanding exercise
that generally involves making assumptions about a large number of
associated variables. Predicting the security of electricity supply, en-
vironmental impacts and related costs requires sound modeling
[26,27]. Obviously, the level of security of supply has remained high so
far in spite of an already significant share of RE in the German elec-
tricity consumption [28–30]. This is due to a number of directed
measures, such as the extension and improvement of the electricity grid
or changes in the bahavior of power producers and consumers. Ac-
cording to Huneke et al. [29], the adaption of the electricity grid to
meet the demands of more decentralized power production, consistent
demand-side management, and both short-term and long-term storage,
will play a decisive role in adjusting the system to a further rising share
of RE and maintaining security of supply. These key elements are
commonly mentioned in the academic literature [31–34]. The Konrad-
Adenauer-foundation [35] adds that a market-based, technology-neu-
tral increase in flexibility requires interlinkages across sectors and a
level playing field. In the context of diminishing shares of baseload
power plants, Jungjohann [36] also highlights the importance of sector
coupling, which is apt to reduce the need for costlier options such as
curtailment or battery storage. Although the level of security of
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electricity supply remained high over the past years, the number of
redispatch actions required to ensure grid stability has increased sig-
nificantly, indicating that it has become more challenging and costly to
maintain this high level of supply security [3].
Summing up, although most RE is already cost competitive and the
level of security of supply is still largely unaffected by the increased
shares of intermittent sources, further expansion of RE in the course of
the energy transition will intensify integration challenges. These will
call for intelligent economic solutions, market reforms, enhanced de-
mand-side management and cross-border interconnections, appropriate
business models for utilities, R&D funding to spur technological pro-
gress and the building of ample storage capacity to reduce inter-
mittency problems [37].
3. Modeling and simulation results
This section starts by introducing the reference scenario for our
policy analysis. In Section 3.1 we first present our general modeling
framework. Next, we develop a dataset that we then use for making a
projection of the electricity market (representing the status quo). This
projection is subsequently used as the reference scenario in our policy
analysis. In Sections 3.2–3.6 we develop five policy scenarios that aim
at securing sufficient electricity supply and RE expansion. The policy
scenarios apply two different electricity market designs, considering the
cases of both FIT support as well as free market conditions for RE.
Furthermore, the policy scenarios assume both conventional and RE
power plants as technologies available for supplementation capacities.
We evaluate our policy scenarios on the basis of three main criteria: the
development of power plants capacity (especially with regard to RE
expansion), CO2 emissions and the costs that are necessary to maintain
security of supply.
3.1. Reference scenario
3.1.1. Fundamental electricity market model
This subsection presents the theoretical underpinnings for our re-
ference scenario (i.e. the status quo). We assume that both conventional
electricity and RE are freely traded on the spot market. The economic
impacts of this assumption are analyzed by means of an electricity
market model, the Load Duration Curve model (LDCM) [38–40]. The
LDCM is based on the Load Duration Curve (LDC) and the Merit Order
Curve (MO). It allows to determine electricity prices and to calculate
the contribution margins of power plants. In the LDC, the hourly elec-
tricity demand in MW for the entire 8760 h a year is listed in des-
cending order. In the MO, the electricity supply of RE and conventional
power plants is ranked in ascending order of marginal costs.
By linking LDC and MO, it is possible to determine the applicable
electricity prices for the hourly amounts of demand in a year. Electricity
prices for each MW supplied, as identified from the MO, are assigned to
the respective electricity demands in MW from the LDC. On that basis,
electricity prices for the demanded quantities are allocated to the cor-
responding duration in hours. This leads to the so-called Price Duration
Curve (PDC). Based on the PDC, the contribution margins (CM) of each
power plant (PPi) with marginal costs (MCPPi) in the spot market can be
determined by means of integral calculus:
=CMPP PDC x MCPP x dx[ ( ) ( )]i d i
0
i
(1)
where x=number of yearly production hours, di=production hours
(for power plant i).
Taking into account each power plant’s full capacity (CPPi) in MW,
the total contribution margin (TCM) of each power plant (PPi) can be
defined as follows:=TCMPP CPP CMPP·i i i (2)
The net present value (NPV) of a power plant is now given by:
= +=NPVPP TCMPP FCPPdr( (1 ) )i n
n
i
n
i
n
n
1
op
(3)
where superscript n refers to the year of production,FCPPin are the
annualized fixed costs of a power plant, nop represents the operating
lifetime of PPi and dr represents the discount rate (for more details see
[1]).
Through the application of the LDCM, the profitability of conven-
tional and RE power plants is determined for the period under con-
sideration. The NPV of each power plant (for each year) is calculated
for a time span of ten years (nop). In addition, an optimization modeling
is executed in order to identify the NPV maximizing investment capa-
city in MW in one of the following power plant technologies: lignite,
hard coal, combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT), gas turbines (GT), wind
energy onshore, wind energy offshore, PV, hydropower, biomass and
geothermal.
During the period under consideration, power plant shut-downs
according to their assumed life cycle are taken into account. Apart from
power plants that are taken out of the market due to reaching the end of
their technical lifecycle, decommissions of power plants on the basis of
economic considerations are modeled as well. In this context, it is as-
sumed that a power plant is shut down in case its NPV is negative for
five years in a row. Both power plant shut-downs, as well as new in-
vestments, are assumed to take effect in the subsequent year, respec-
tively.
3.1.2. Data
This subsection presents the database we developed for our study
that covers the period 2016 to 2035. We choose 2016 as our starting
year, as our simulation is based on data of actual existing power plants.
The forecast of German electricity demand is also based on actual data
from the European Energy Exchange [41]. Based on these data for the
years 2010 to 2013, we calculate the hourly average electricity de-
mand. These figures form the basis for the projection of electricity de-
mand up to 2035. To account for possible changes in the development
of actual demand, we carried out a sensitivity analysis (± 0.50%/year;
see Section 4).
The representation of the conventional complex of power plants is
based on data from the Federal Network Agency [42]. The Federal
Network Agency is a German regulatory authority entrusted to ensure
efficient and undistorted competition in the energy market. To account
for any unavailability of plants, as well as start-up and shut-down times,
the installed capacity of each power plant is reduced by 10%. Economic
and technical data of conventional power plants are mainly based on
historical data that have been provided by the research department of
the Westdeutsche Landesbank German Bank [43]. Based on this dataset
and forecasts by the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of
Cologne (EWI), the Institute of Economic Structures Research (GWS)
and the Prognos Research Centre [44] as well as the Agency for Re-
newable Energies [45], we calculated the future projection of our
model parameters (any missing data of existing power plants are de-
termined by linear interpolation). The installed capacity of RE power
plants in 2016 (i.e. the starting year of the simulation) is based on data
from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy [46].
Kaltschmitt et al. [47] and Deutsche Windguard GmbH [48] serve as
the basis for economic and technical data of RE. Bioenergy and geo-
thermal energy are assigned a customary availability factor of 0.9,
while the availability factor of hydroenergy is 0.4 [49]. The availability
factors of solar and wind energy are calculated based on time series
analysis. For this purpose, we compared the real hourly production of
solar and wind energy between 2010 and 2014 with the theoretical
maximum production per hour [50].
A key assumption is that conventional electricity is fully traded on the
spot market. Furthermore, we assume that there is no transnational trade
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in electricity – i.e. we focus exclusively on the German market. To account
for peak load prices, the prices on the spot market are increased by 5%. As
a discount rate, we assume a weighted average cost of capital equal to
7.14% [51]. Changes in markup prices, the discount rate, as well as CO2
prices, are also subject to a sensitivity analysis (see Section 4).
3.1.3. Projection
This subsection presents the projection of the electricity market
based on our dataset. This projection is used as our reference scenario
in the subsequent policy analysis. Fig. 1 shows the projection of in-
stalled capacity. It can be seen that projected conventional and RE
power plant capacity exhibit little fluctuation between 2016 and 2022.
There are hardly any investments in new capacity and the majority of
decommissionings are due to power plants reaching the end of their life
cycle. In 2022, the NPV optimization modeling as discussed in Section
3.1.1 leads to a substantial investment in onshore wind energy. This is
because the zero marginal costs of wind energy generate large con-
tribution margins, as the electricity prices are set by high-marginal-
costs conventional power plants. Through this investment, RE power
plants in the market are sufficient to meet total electricity demand. Due
to the low marginal costs of RE power plants, all remaining conven-
tional power plants are driven out of the market. However, as a result of
this, the price of electricity that is paid to RE power plants in the
market also becomes zero (or at least close to zero, accounting for the
very low marginal costs of biomass and a peak load price increase of
5%). These impacts are known as the merit order effect of RE (for more
details see [1]). As a consequence, both RE and conventional power
plants incur substantial losses in each year from 2023 to 2027. By as-
sumption (see Section 3.1.1), after these five consecutive years of ne-
gative NPVs, all power plants are decommissioned (i.e. no power plants
remain in the market in 2028). Following this, in 2028, investment in
mainly conventional power plant technologies takes place according to
the NPV maximization modeling. However, the total amount of
installed capacity in 2029 is only sufficient to meet around two thirds of
demand. In 2029, the same cycle (as the one in 2022) occurs, with
substantial investments in wind energy onshore. Again, the resulting
merit order effect of RE leads to economic losses for all power plants in
the market from 2030 to 2034. As a result, in 2035, after five years of
consecutive losses, all power plants are decommissioned, which again
leads to an extreme shortage of electricity supply. To sum up, the
modeling of RE and conventional power plants under free market
conditions shows that the merit order effect of RE rules out a profitable
operation of power plants and a stable electricity supply.
With regard to total CO2 emissions for the reference scenario, Fig. 2
shows a relatively stable quantity of about 250 million tons per year
between 2016 and 2022. Through the substantial investments in
carbon-free wind energy in 2022 and the resulting replacement of
conventional power plants, emissions are reduced to zero from 2023
onwards. Even though conventional power plants are still present, they
are not operational anymore and, consequently, do not emit any CO2.
After the decommissionings of all power plants in 2028 (due to eco-
nomic losses), emissions rise temporarily to more than 200 million tons
in the following year as a result of investments in conventional power
plants. This market situation again fosters substantial investments in
wind energy in 2029, which lead to the merit order effect of RE in the
following years; consecutively, conventional power plants are shifted
out of the market again and CO2 emissions drop to zero.
3.2. Standard policy scenario
3.2.1. Description
We design the standard policy scenario to address electricity shortages
(based on our reference scenario projections). In cases of insufficient
electricity supply, we assume that RE is taken out of the free market and is
instead subject to a FIT mechanism for the rest of the period under con-
sideration. The FIT mechanism assists the RE sector to meet the expansion
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Fig. 1. Installed conventional and RE power plant capacity and total demand curve (reference scenario).
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goals of the German Federal Government (i.e. an RE share in total elec-
tricity generation between 40–45% by 2025 and 55–60% by 2035, [2].
The average annual tariffs for each RE technology (based on actual data
between 2000 and 2016) are extrapolated until the end of the period [52].
We assume that conventional power plants are subsidized. If their NPV is
negative for five years in a row, they are now not decommissioned, but
remain in the market. In this case, the costs of negative NPVs are sub-
sidized, starting from the sixth year. In the event of insufficient capacity in
the market, complementary investment in efficient Supplement Gas Tur-
bine (GT) power plants is made. These supplementation power plants also
receive subsidies in case of negative NPVs. We call this first scenario
“standard”, since the energy from conventional power plants is traded
based on the common electricity market design, while RE is subject to the
classical FIT mechanism that was applied for several years in order to
foster RE expansion.
3.2.2. Simulation results
According to the reference scenario (see Section 3.1.3), insufficient
supply is caused by large investments in wind energy in 2022 and later
on in 2029. For this reason, within the standard policy scenario, RE is
taken out of the free market in 2022. From 2022 onwards, REs are
subject to a FIT mechanism and develop according to the expansion
goals of the German Federal Government. As Fig. 3 demonstrates, the
standard policy scenario prevents the merit order effect of RE and en-
sures sufficient electricity supply in each year of the period under
consideration. Moreover, it allows for a continuously increasing ex-
pansion of RE.
Fig. 4 shows the annual total CO2 emissions resulting from the
standard policy scenario. Until 2022 emissions increase due to the
phasing out of nuclear power plants (which generate electricity with
minimal emissions). After 2022 the increasing amount of RE leads to
decreasing CO2 emissions. However, even though RE continuously in-
creases, total annual emissions do not decrease to the same extent. This
is because market conditions trigger investments in lignite power
plants, which have higher CO2 emissions compared to other conven-
tional power plant technologies (e.g. hard coal or gas).
Fig. 5 displays the monetary costs associated with the standard
policy scenario. Between 2023 and 2027, these costs relate to subsidies
given as part of the FIT mechanism. However, starting from 2028 on-
wards, costs increase considerably as a result of financial support pro-
vided to unprofitable conventional power plants (subsidies in the range
of €0.5 and 1.0 billion per year are needed to ensure that these power
plants remain in the market). Part of these subsidies are also directed to
the Supplement GT power plants, which were installed in order to fill
the electricity gap. Overall, in order to ensure security of supply and RE
expansion, subsidies amounting to around €8.5 billion need to be
granted according to the standard policy scenario.
3.3. Free market green policy scenario
3.3.1. Description
For the free market green policy scenario, we assume that RE is
traded on the free market over the entire period under consideration.
This implies that RE power plants are decommissioned in case their
NPV is negative for five years in a row. Conventional power plants are
treated in the same way as in the standard policy scenario described in
Section 3.2.
3.3.2. Simulation results
Fig. 6 shows that power plant capacity in the free market green
policy scenario looks similar to the reference scenario projection be-
tween 2016 and 2027. There are large investments in wind energy in
2022, which lead to the merit order effect taking place between 2023
and 2027. In contrast to the reference scenario, there is no lack of
electricity supply in 2028 as power plants remain in the market even
when running economic losses. In the event of insufficient capacity, an
equivalent investment in a mixture of different RE power plants is made
by the government. This mixture is based on the distribution of RE
power plant technologies according to the expansion goals of the
German Federal Government [14].
By assumption, unprofitable conventional power plants are not shut
down and any capacity gap in the market is filled up with an investment in
Supplement GT power plants. However, the high marginal-cost power
plants (e.g. gas, hard coal) in the market again lead to substantial wind
energy investments in 2028. Between 2029 and 2034 the same cycle (to
the one six years earlier) repeats itself (and starts once again in 2035).
As the development of power plant capacity is similar to the reference
scenario, the time path of total CO2 emissions is also comparable (Fig. 7).
The main differences occur in 2028 and 2034, when CO2 emissions rise to
more than 200 and 150 Megatons respectively. This is because of the
provided subsidies for conventional power plants that allow facilities to
remain in the market despite running losses. Furthermore, the under-
capacities in these years are compensated with investment in Supplement
GT power plants, which generate additional CO2 emissions. In the periods
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between 2023 to 2027 and 2029 to 2033 emissions become negligible,
since only RE power plants operate in the market.
Fig. 8 shows the monetary costs associated with the free market
green policy scenario. As a consequence of the merit order effect,
conventional power plants need to be subsidized starting from 2021.
The production of additional electricity by Supplement GT power plants
also needs to be subsidized from 2033 onwards. In 2028, in particular,
and, to a smaller extent in 2034, the subsidies for conventional power
plants are lower, as there is no RE in the market, which leads to rela-
tively high electricity prices. Total subsidies in the period between 2016
and 2035 account for around €25 billion. There are no subsidies di-
rected to RE and RE power plants become decommissioned when facing
sustained economic losses.
3.4. Green support policy scenario
3.4.1. Description
In the green support policy scenario, conventional power plants are
treated as in the reference scenario (see Section 3.1). They are taken out
of the market either because they have reached the end of their tech-
nical lifecycle or for economic reasons (i.e. in case of a negative NPV for
five years in a row). On the other hand, RE receives subsidies, which
allows RE power plants to remain in the market even when running
economic losses. In the event of insufficient capacity, an equivalent
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investment in a mixture of different RE power plants is made by the
government. This mixture is based on the distribution of RE power
plant technologies according to the expansion goals of the German
Federal Government [14].
3.4.2. Simulation results
Fig. 9 shows that power plant capacity develops similarly to the
reference scenario during the first years of our analysis. Starting from
2025 onwards, substantial investments in wind power lead to the merit
order effect of RE. All conventional power plants are driven out of the
market (as a result of the low marginal costs of RE and expected drastic
drop in electricity prices). As a consequence, all conventional power
plants are decommissioned for economic reasons in 2030. On the other
hand, RE power plants remain in the market as a result of being sub-
sidized. Additional investment in a mixture of RE power plants ensures
that the security of supply is always maintained (see Section 3.4.1).
During the first nine years, CO2 emissions amount to around 250
Megatons per year. From 2025 onwards, the merit order effect of RE
(and the resulting displacement of conventional power plants) lead to
an almost complete elimination of carbon emissions (see Fig. 10).
The costs attributed to financial support for RE are shown in Fig. 11.
Between 2021 and 2029, many PV power plants are unable to operate
profitably and need support until they reach the end of their economic
lifecycle. From 2030 onwards, all RE power plants need to be
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subsidized as a result of the merit order effect of RE. Additional fi-
nancial support is provided in the form of investment in a mixture of
green power plants in order to eliminate any electricity shortages. In
total, subsidies add up to around €549 billion.
3.5. Regulated RE adaptation policy scenario
3.5.1. Description
This scenario relies on Coester et al. [1], who develop a novel
electricity market design that simultaneously ensures stable electricity
supply and RE expansion.1 It assumes that the electricity price and
profitability of conventional power plants are significantly dependent
on the level of adaptation of conventional power plants to RE supply.
Against this background, we utilize a methodology that allows us to
model the most cost-effective composition of power plants.
We apply this policy scenario to address concerns of electricity
shortages (as identified in the reference scenario). In the current sce-
nario, we assume furthermore, that RE is taken out of the free market
and becomes subject to a FIT mechanism. The remaining complex of
conventional power plants is modeled to be optimally adapted to the
residual load (RLDC) for each consecutive year. This RLDC represents
total electricity demand reduced by electricity production from RE. As a
next step, for each of the 8760 h a year, the most cost-effective power
plant technology is selected, allowing us to derive the efficiency cost
curve. This corresponds to a complex of power plants that is optimally
adapted to RE supply. As this optimally adapted complex of power
plants does not take account of power plant breakdowns or temporary
shut-downs due to maintenance, the optimal capacity is increased by
5% per power plant technology. On this basis, the optimally adapted
complex of power plants is compared to existing real conventional
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1 This is equivalent to the ‘new market design’ described in Coester et al.
[10].
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power plant capacities. The capacities of existing power plants in the
market are allocated on the basis of optimal adaptation guidelines. In
case there is need for additional capacity of a particular power plant
technology, any identified gaps are filled up by the excess capacity of
remaining technologies.
In case that excess capacities still fail to meet the entire demanded
quantity, an investment (in additional conventional capacity) is made
to optimally fill the gap. This assumes that necessary investments ma-
terialize in the next year. If, on the contrary, the existing power plant
capacity exceeds demand, redundant power plants are not allowed to
offer their capacities on the market. Based on this allocation of pro-
duction capacities, the profitability of power plants is again modeled by
utilizing the LDCM (see Section 3.1.1). By assumption, conventional
power plants are subsidized (and are not decommissioned due to
losses).
3.5.2. Simulation results
Fig. 12 demonstrates how the development of conventional power
plant capacity in the regulated RE adaptation policy scenario differs
from the regular market designs applied in the previous scenarios.
There are now considerably more gas and oil power plants in the
market. Compared to other conventional power plant technologies
(such as lignite or hard coal), these power plants have the advantage of
reacting more flexibly to changes in (the rather volatile) RE supply.
Consequently, the utilization of these power plants is more cost-effec-
tive. The expansion of RE is continuous thanks to the support of the FIT
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mechanism. Over the entire period under consideration, there is always
sufficient supply to meet demand.
Through the planned phasing out of nuclear energy, carbon emis-
sions rise until 2022 (see Fig. 13). After that, emissions decline and lie
between approximately 125 and 210 million tons per year (originating
primarily from the operation of CO2-intensive lignite power plants in
the market). The observed decrease of emissions during the last years of
our investigation (between 2031 and 2035) is attributed to an increase
in RE supply and additional investment in nuclear power plants (which
emit little CO2). While the German Federal Government [53] has
decided on phasing out nuclear energy (and this has been incorporated
in the simulation), this policy scenario allows for the possibility of
investments in new nuclear energy in the future in case of demand
shortages (as those depicted in the reference scenario, see Section
3.1.3).
Fig. 14 shows the monetary costs associated with this scenario; from
2023 onwards, subsidies support RE through the FIT mechanism, and
later on (after 2027) also base load power plants (e.g. lignite and hard
coal) that run losses. This is because the RE adaptation design gives
preference to medium or peak load power plants, which are better able
to adapt to fluctuating RE supply. Later on, oil power plants also need to
be subsidized to remain in the market. These oil power plants only
operate during times of extreme peak load (being, hence, unable to
receive sufficient gross margins). The total costs for securing electricity
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supply and RE expansion amount to around €5 billion.
3.6. Free market RE adaptation policy scenario
3.6.1. Description
The Free market RE adaptation policy scenario only differs from the
regulated RE adaptation scenario by assuming that RE is not subject to a
FIT mechanism but instead competes in the free market. All earlier
assumptions regarding the treatment of conventional power plants (as
in the regulated RE adaptation policy scenario) still hold.
3.6.2. Simulation results
From 2016 to 2022, the development of power plant capacity in the
freemarket RE adaptation policy scenario is similar to the regulated RE
adaptation scenario (Fig. 15). However, due to the assumption that RE
competes in the free market, the NPV optimization results in large in-
vestments in wind energy in 2023. This additional wind energy leads to
the merit order effect, by which the electricity price drops to almost
zero; as a result of this, and after five years of operation and consecutive
losses, wind power plants shut down. As conventional power plants are
subsidized, they remain in the market (and help meet more than two
thirds of the electricity demand in 2028). However, this market en-
vironment (of comparably high electricity prices, as these are now set
by high-marginal-costs conventional power plants) again fosters sub-
stantial investments in wind energy. This will again lead to a repetition
of the merid order effect and closure of wind energy plans (while the
same cycle of reinvestment in RE will repeat itself for a third time in
2035).
With conventional power plants dominating energy production be-
tween 2016 and 2022, annual CO2 emissions lie between approximately
200 and 250 million tons (Fig. 16). The high wind energy investments
in the following years lead to the displacement of conventional power
plants, with CO2 emissions dropping close to zero. In 2028 and 2034, all
RE power plants are decommissioned for economic reasons, which
gives rise to a temporary increase in carbon emissions (from conven-
tional power plants).
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In the free market RE adaptation policy scenario, we assume that RE
power plants participate in the free market and become decommis-
sioned when running sustained losses for a period of 5 consecutive
years. For this reason, there are no subsidies directed to RE. As Fig. 17
demonstrates, conventional power plants, however, need substantial
subsidies from 2029 onwards. This is due to all conventional power
plants sustaining economic losses due to the merit order effect of RE.
While this effect consecutively leads to decommissionings of wind
power plants in 2028, conventional power plants remain in the market
per assumption. Through the absence of RE in 2028, conventional
power plants do not need any further subsidies for this particular year.
However, this market situation of comparably high electricity prices
again fosters substantial wind energy investments in subsequent years.
These investments lead to a decrease of the electricity price and a
displacement of conventional power plants. Consequently, conven-
tional power plants need high subsidies from 2029 on. After five years,
the same disinvestment and investment cycle as before starts in 2034
(with the associated increase in subsidies for conventional power
plants). Total costs for subsidies amount to around €18 billion.
4. Discussion and sensitivity analysis
In this section, we further analyze our simulation results by mu-
tually comparing the different policy scenarios. Our comparison
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includes security of supply, amount of RE produced, CO2 emissions,
subsidies needed and external costs relating to environmental and
health damages caused by electricity generation. We make re-
commendations for the most suitable countermeasure. Finally, we
present the results of a sensitivity analysis on some key assumptions.
4.1. Security of supply, RE expansion and CO2 emissions
The reference scenario demonstrated how current market condi-
tions lead to insufficient capacity to meet electricity demand (see
Section 3.1.3). Table 1 shows that until 2035 around 8.8 million GWh
of RE is produced in the reference scenario. Apart from the freemarket
RE adaptation policy scenario, all other policy scenarios are able to
guarantee the security of supply. With around 13.4 million GWh, the
highest amount of RE is produced within the free market green and the
freemarket RE adaptation policy scenarios. Both scenarios assume that
RE is traded entirely on the free electricity market. In the green support
policy scenario, less RE is produced (around 8.4 million GWh). This is
because we assume that conventional power plants are not subsidized
and become decommissioned when running sustained losses. As a
consequence, the electricity price decreases, which in turn reduces the
profitability of RE investments. Overall, CO2 emissions are compara-
tively low with a total of around 2 billion tons in each of the three
policy scenarios where RE is traded on the free market. In the standard
and regulated RE adaptation policy scenarios, the lowest amounts of RE
are produced (5.0 million GWh). In line with this, CO2 emissions in
both scenarios are higher with a total of approximately 4 and 4.5 billion
tons respectively (see Table 1).
4.2. Subsidies
Fig. 18 depicts the total subsidies corresponding to the five policy
scenarios. The green support policy scenario requires by far the most
subsidies. With around €549 billion (see Table 1), subsidies in this
scenario are approximately a hundred times larger compared to the
regulated RE adaptation policy scenario (which requires the lowest
amount of subsidies close to €5 billion). The large subsidies in the green
support policy scenario relate to its underlying assumption of conven-
tional power plants being decommissioned when unprofitable, while RE
is subsidized. This leads to the merit order effect of RE, which reduces
electricity prices to almost zero and renders RE power plants unable to
operate profitably. Total subsidies for the remaining policy scenarios lie
between around €8 and 25 billion. In the regulated RE adaptation
policy scenario (with the lowest amount of subsidies), the costs refer to
financial support provided to RE (as part of the FIT mechanism) and to
conventional power plants that do not operate profitably. This result
shows that a more consistent expansion of RE leads to a higher profit-
ability of power plants and, thus, less need of subsidies to maintain
security of supply. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that the
regulated RE adaptation scenario [1] gives rise to an efficient and
profitable operation of conventional power plants. However, the stan-
dard policy scenario, which also applies a FIT mechanism for RE but
instead utilizes the current market design for conventional power
plants, leads to only slightly higher subsidies of around €8 billion. To
sum up, the results point out that the merit order effect of RE has a
significant impact on the profitability of power plants. This leads to
shut-downs and, as a consequence, the expansion of RE and security of
supply are both in danger. Of the analysed policy scenarios, the most
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Table 1
Comparison of policy scenarios.
Reference scenario and
policy scenarios
Assumption RE Assumption
Conventional energy
Security of
Supply
RE produced in
GWh
CO2 emissions in
Megatons
Subsidies in
M€
External costs
in M€
∑ Subsidies and
external costs in M€
Reference scenario Free market Free market No 8,799,807 1867 0 44,604 44,604
Standard FIT Subsidization Yes 5,013,884 4533 8,473 77,040 85,513
Free market green Free market Subsidization Yes 13,370,005 2015 25,019 46,912 71,932
Green support Subsidization Free market Yes 8,389,771 2161 549,430 47,394 596,824
Regulated RE
adaptation
FIT Optimal adaptation/
subsidization
Yes 5,013,884 4078 5,419 77,914 83,334
Free market RE
adaptation
Free market Optimal adaptation/
subsidization
No 13,370,005 2322 17,560 50,393 67,953
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cost efficient instrument to counteract these developments is to utilize a
FIT mechanism for RE and to keep conventional power plants either in
the existing market design or to apply the new developed market me-
chanism. However, up until now, we have avoided discussing the ex-
ternal costs relating to environmental and health damage caused by
electricity generation. In the next subsection we investigate how the
inclusion of external costs impacts our results.
4.3. Inclusion of external costs of electricity generation
In order to draw a more accurate comparison between our reference
scenario and the five policy scenarios, we include the external costs of
electricity generation in our calculations. It is generally claimed that
environmental and health damages caused by the respective energy
generation technologies are not sufficiently reflected in the market
prices of electricity [54,55]. These damages (the costs of which are
often borne by third parties and future generations rather than the di-
rect buyers and sellers of electricity) are referred to as “externalities” in
the economics literature [56]. When determining the external costs of
energy generation, calculations need to include the environmental and
health impacts of all activities required for electricity production (e.g.
damages associated with the construction and installation of equip-
ment, transportation, operational activities or the restoration of a site
after its closure, see [57].
For this purpose, we calculated the average external costs per MWh
produced for each generation technology based on data from Krewitt
and Schlomann [58], Hohmeyer [59] Enquete Kommission [60],
Enquete Kommission [61], Friedrich [62] and Braun [63]. These ex-
ternal costs are then multiplied by the production volumes of the cor-
responding power plant technologies in each policy scenario. Table 2
provides an overview of the external costs that we assumed for our
simulations.
Fig. 19 and Table 1 show that the total external costs of the five
policy scenarios are in the range between approximately €46 and 78
billion. The market conditions for RE are a defining factor behind these
differences. Both in the standard and in the regulated RE adaptation
policy scenario, where RE is subject to an FIT mechanism, the costs of
externalities amount to approximately €78 billion. On the other hand,
the other policy scenarios, which assume a free market for RE, show
lower external costs between €47 and 50 billion. In the presence of a
FIT mechanism, RE expands steadily but not as rapidly as under free
market conditions. In contrast, the free market environment (with
comparably higher electricity prices) fosters additional RE investments,
hence reducing the need for conventional power plants and lowering
the corresponding external costs.
Fig. 20 (see also Table 1) provides the sum of subsidies and external
costs per policy scenario; the green support scenario remains the least cost
efficient option. As mentioned in Section 4.1, the freemarket RE adapta-
tion scenario (despite its lower total costs) is not a viable alternative, since
it fails to guarantee the supply of security. The remaining three policy
scenarios are all characterized by similar total costs ranging between ap-
proximately €72 and 86 billion. The free market green policy scenario is
now more cost-efficient in comparison to the standard and the regulated
RE adaptation policy scenarios (while the opposite held when only
1
10
100
1,000
10,000
1,00,000
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035
Su
bs
id
ie
s 
in
 M
 €
 
Years 
Standard Free-trade green Green support Regulated RE adaptation Free-Market RE adaptation
Fig. 18. Comparison of subsidies across policy scenarios.
Table 2
Assumed external costs in € cent per MWh.
Lignite Hard Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydro-power Geo-thermal Biomass Wind Photo-voltaics
11.07 8.97 14.54 4.79 54.73 0.32 0.80 1.32 0.13 0.86
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subsidies were considered, see Section 4.2). This is because the free market
green policy scenario is associated with the lowest CO2 emissions across all
scenarios that ensure security of energy supply. This result shows that free
market conditions for RE are a competitive viable option in case external
costs are taken into consideration and conventional power plants are
subject to a subsidy mechanism.
4.4. Sensitivity analysis
Finally, we carry out a sensitivity analysis by relaxing some of our
key assumptions (results available from the authors upon request).
Overall, the results show that increased CO2 emission costs do not re-
duce the profitability of power plants, as these costs can be transferred
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to electricity prices. Modest variations in electricity demand also do not
have a substantial effect on the installed power plant capacity. We also
consider alternative scenarios corresponding to a halving of the dis-
count rate as well as a doubling of markup prices. These alternative
scenarios improve the profitability of power plants and, thus, increase
installed capacity substantially; at the same time, our key findings re-
garding energy security and the cost efficiency of alternative policy
scenarios still hold.
5. Conclusions
Over the past years, technological improvements have resulted in
substantial cost reductions for renewable energy. At present, many re-
newable energy technologies are cost-competitive compared to con-
ventional power plants. Due to their marginal costs being close to zero,
the expansion of renewable energy leads to a displacement of conven-
tional power plants in the market and to a reduction of the electricity
price (i.e. the merit order effect of renewable energy materializes). For
this reason, many conventional power plants are unable to operate
profitably and, consequently, have to shut down. In this context, we
studied the impacts of renewable energy under free market conditions
on the security of electricity supply, based on empirical data. Our re-
ference scenario showed that such a market environment leads to de-
commissionings of conventional power plants and, as a consequence, to
energy supply falling short of demand.
We developed five policy scenarios with the aim of securing elec-
tricity supply as well as renewable energy expansion. Our results show
that the green support policy scenario (where renewable energy re-
ceives subsidies, while conventional energy is traded on the free
market) leads to a decrease of the electricity price close to zero, which
in turn necessitates very large subsidies to compensate for the losses of
power plants. On the other hand, our analysis reveals that the regulated
renewable energy adaptation policy scenario (with a fixed feed-in tariff
mechanism for renewable energy and optimally-adapted conventional
power plants) results in the lowest subsidies necessary to maintain se-
curity of supply. However, the free market green policy scenario (where
renewable energy is traded on the free market, while conventional
power plants are subsidized) appears to be the most cost efficient op-
tion, once we take into account the external costs of electricity gen-
eration. This is because the free market green policy scenario leads to
the lowest CO2 emissions (out of all policy scenarios that ensure se-
curity of energy supply).
Policy-makers need to realize that the merit order effect of renew-
able energy leads to significant economic problems not only for con-
ventional power plants but also for renewable energy units (which, as a
consequence, threatens both further renewable energy expansion, as
well as the security of electricity supply). In addition, and to obtain a
transparent overview of the real costs of energy generation, policy-
makers should take into consideration the external costs of energy
generation.
Our analysis emphasizes the need for some form of governmental
intervention in order to maintain an uninterrupted security of supply
together with further renewable energy expansion. Each form of gov-
ernmental intervention requires a certain amount of administrative
effort. For the adoption of the renewable energy adaptation market
design, in particular, there would be a need for changes in fundamental
market conditions but also continuous regulation. Furthermore, even
though the application of the free market green policy secures energy
supply and renewable energy expansion at the lowest total costs, this
scenario can only be utilized for a limited period of time as conven-
tional power plants gradually reach the end of their lifecycles. In order
to reach an ongoing expansion of renewable energy without new in-
vestments in conventional power plants, this scenario would also have
to be amended in the long term.
Against this background, further research should build on and ex-
pand our current analytical framework by considering the effects of
international trade in electricity, growing energy storage options and by
investigating new forms of remunerating renewable energy in a market
environment with a decreasing number of conventional power plants.
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